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Abstract 
The focus of this study is to estimate an equation explaining the determinants of dowry. In this paper, we 
address a very common socio-economic problem for sub-continent, the problem of dowry. From a social 
planner's perspective, who wants to reduce overall dowry transfers, we consider the effect of change in a 
few relevant parameters like husband height, wife height, wet land, dry land, years of marriage and years of 
education for women & men on these decisions.  
According to the various studies the dowry phenomenon is exist heavily in rural sub-continent, at the same 
time research related to this system is very rare. The aim of this paper is to estimate an equation explaining 
the determinants of dowry. Several interpretations for dowry are distinguished using a simple theoretical 
framework and the predictions of this model are tested. Using the data provided us for this project is tested 
and reliable so that we will be able to draw our own testable relationships and determinants of dowry. The 
data will be use in the following sections for further analysis by estimating the determinants of dowry using 
multiple regression analysis. The study suggests that even though there are religious and cultural differences, 
the system of dowry in Pakistan appears to be for the same reasons as in India  
 
A theoretical framework was developed that was inclusive of all the required variables by testing through 
the multiple regression analysis and the experimental findings shows the independent variable used to test 
have an impact on dowry by applying multiple regression step-wise method.  
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INTRODUCTION: 
Dowry is one of those social practices which no educated person would own up with pride, although many 
still adhere to this much deplorable practice. Dowry continues to be given and taken. Even among the 
educated sections of society, dowry continues to form an essential part the negotiations that take place in an 
arranged marriage. (Birodkar 1994) 
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During the marriage ceremony the articles comprising the dowry are proudly displayed in the wedding hall. 
Dowry is still very much a status symbol. A number of marriage-negotiations break down if there is no 
consensus between the bride's and groom‟s families. Dowry deaths of a newly married bride are still 
regularly in the news.  
 
Although the practice of dowry exists in many countries, it has assumed the proportion of a challenge to the 
forces of modernity and change only in India. Many reasons are put forward for explaining this practice. It 
is said that a dowry is meant to help the newly-weds to set up their own home. Parents transfer wealth to 
their children in many ways. The dowry is distinctive because it is a large transfer made to a daughter at the 
time of her marriage. (Botticini & Siow, 2000). 
 
The sums of cash and goods involved are often so large that the payment can lead to impoverishment of the 
bridal family. This has a devastating effect on the lives of unmarried women who are increasingly 
considered burdensome economic liabilities. The custom of dowry has been linked to the practice of female 
infanticide and, among married women, to the more obvious connection with bride-burning and dowry-
death, i.e., physical harm visited on the wife if promised dowry payments are not forthcoming (Anderson, 
S., 2001). The dowry is given as compensation to the groom's parents for the amount they have spent in 
educating and upbringing their son. These explanations may seem logical in the present day context, but 
they cannot explain how this practice originated. 
 
Dowry is a massive social ill on both sides of the Pakistan-India border and who hasn‟t heard of the 
infamous bride burning where the girl who brings insufficient dowry is burnt „accidentally‟ by her in laws 
so that a new „prey‟ may be caught who can bring in a better dowry.(Sarfaraz. 2008) 
 
PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW THEORITICAL FRAME WORK: 
 
The rise of the dowry system among Muslims of subcontinent appears to date back only some 
decades. White (1992: 102) and Rozario (1992: 134) note that the prevalence of the system 
reflects a change over the last two generations, following the independence of Bangladesh. Dowry 
was previously practiced mainly in urbanized, more affluent classes. The 
„
tyranny of dowry
‟
 existed 
in urban areas since the late 1960s, but has now spread to rural populations (Alam and Matin, 
1984:7). 
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Like many other customs and social institutions in subcontinent, dowry is said to originate from 
Hindu customs. Traditional Hindu law recognizes several types of marriage, the most approved 
being the Brahma form, where the bride‟s father gives her away without any consideration 
(Jhabvala, 1981: 18). In the Brahma form, the bride
‟
s father offered his daughter adorned properly, 
but was under no compulsion, and these gifts were given to the daughter personally (Apte, 1978: 
201). Such voluntary gifts were to provide economic security for the daughter in her new home 
and were considered as str
¯ıdhan (property of the woman). Ahmed and Naher (1987: 137) refer to 
Brahma marriage as dowry or joutuk marriage and argue that, though this form was once confined 
to Brahmins, it later became accepted by other castes.(Shahnaz, 2006) 
 
Some authors have tried to justify this system of dowry by reference to the practices of the Prophet 
Mohammed, that is, sunna. Despite agreement that dowry payments are not among the basics of a Muslim 
marriage, there are contentions that it forms part of the sunna of the Prophet, who gave certain items to his 
daughter Fatima at her marriage to Ali, the Prophet‟s cousin (Ansari, 1978: 80–1). The second instance 
quoted by those who see dowry as Islamic is the marriage of Zainab, another daughter of the Prophet, who 
was given a costly necklace by her rich mother (Ansari, 1978: 81). These are not regarded as normative 
sunna, however, since jahez was not mentioned for several other marriages during the Prophet‟s time, nor 
did the companions after the Prophet‟s time emphasize this practice (Ansari, 1978: 82–3). The Koran, the 
traditions of the Prophet (sunna) and other early scholars (for example, the Hedaya), do not back the 
practice of demanding dowry. The traditions of the Prophet call for a man to avoid doing from marriage 
until he can afford marriage and dower. If he cannot afford to get married, he should practice abstinence 
until Allah provides him with sufficient means.(Shahnaz. 2006) 
 
In general, research directly pertaining to the custom of dowry in the rest of South Asia is relatively sparse. 
A notable exception is the study by Lindenbaum (1981) which investigates the transition from bride-price to 
dowry of a predominantly Muslim community in rural subcontinent. 
 
A woman in Pakistan is entitled by law at marriage to: (i) a dowry and marriage gifts from her parents; and 
(ii) a dower (mahr), a bridal gift from the groom which is generally intended to provide some insurance for 
her in the case of divorce (see Patel 1979, Korson and Sabzwari 1984, and Afzal et. al. 1973). Further, 
Pakistani women have the right to inheritance and ownership of property. According to Muslim Personal 
Law (Shariat), daughters are entitled to a half of the share which a son inherits from his father. It  is noted, 
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however, that the dowry she receives at the time of marriage is usually considered her pre-mortem 
inheritance, which is typically less than she is entitled to under the law (see Donnan 1988 and Patel 1979).  
 
A natural question to ask in the exploration of Pakistani dowries is how this custom differs from those in 
India where the severe social consequences of rising dowries have motivated a large body of research aimed at 
explaining the phenomenon. The total cash and goods involved are so large that the dowry payment can lead 
to impoverishment of the bridal family. This has a devastating effect on the lives of unmarried women who 
are increasingly considered stringent economic liabilities. For example, the custom of dowry is often linked 
to the practice of female infanticide. Other repercussions include extreme abuse of women as exemplified 
by terms like “bride-burning" and “dowry-death" becoming commonly used. The links to dowry inflation 
have been drawn by sociologists; for example, Kumari (1989), Chauhan (1995), McCoid (1989), Pawar 
(1990), Lata (1990), and Pathak (1990) address these issues.( Anderson, S., 2000). 
 
As already mentioned, this role for dowry has been emphasized in the recent literature of modern-day 
dowry payments in India. Others have observed that in societies where dowry has occurred, women were 
considered an economic burden since a wife performed little or no income-producing work for the 
household. The second interpretation of dowry therefore links the payments to the productivity of women 
and treats bride-price and dowry paid as opposites. In  societies where women are economically 
productive, a bride-price payment is made to their families to compensate for the loss of a worker. If 
women do not contribute to household income, dowry is paid to the groom's family as a compensation for 
an unproductive member. However, the most common form of dowry is a pre-mortem female inheritance 
where women retain ownership of her gift during marriage, and can reclaim it for her own welfare if the 
marriage is dissolved (see, for example, Goody 1976 and Hughes 1985). This third definition of dowry is 
therefore associated with societies in which inheritance flowed to both sons and daughters. In several 
countries, dowry as a pre-mortem inheritance given to women was written into the constitution, as was 
traditionally the case in Pakistan (Anderson, S., 2000). 
 
On the other hand, characteristics of the bride‟s family at the time of marriage in conjunction with the 
characteristics of her spouse and his family determine the conditions of marriage such as dowries, marrying 
biological relatives, and age at marriage, which in turn affect subsequent socio-economic outcomes for the 
woman and her children Dalmia, (2004), Rao, (1993) and Mobarak and Kuhn and Peters, (2007). 
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The aim of the next section is to develop a model which embeds and distinguishes these given variables in 
data in estimating the equation for dowry paid for marriage in rural subcontinent. 
 
Methodology: 
Data collection and sampling methods  
 
To examine the variables to determine the dowry size, data set on bride-groom characteristics and dowry 
was selected and it was kindly been provided by A.B. Deo Lalikar.
1
 The data comprises 140 respondents. 
The data will be use in the following sections for further analysis by estimating the determinants of dowry 
using multiple regression analysis by step-wise method. 
 
The study has been focused on analysis that dowry paid is dependent on which variables Subject in the rural 
subcontinent. Since the objective of study is to estimate the equation explaining the determinant of dowry so 
all the variables given in the data are takes as independent and the dowry paid is taken as dependent 
variable. 
 
The findings suggested that dowry paid is based on the status and the affluence of husband‟s family as well 
as the education of the husband‟s father that are the important determinants of the incidence of dowries. And 
also one more thing that the influence of husband‟s father education is accounted as a predictor for the system 
of dowry paid. However the literature is also analyzing that since the traditional custom of dowry in 
subcontinent is considered an inheritance to daughters, it appears that this custom still persists in rural areas 
whereas, like in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, the custom has evolved into a groom price payment in urban 
areas (Anderson, S., 2000). 
 
 Data Analysis: Methods/ Testing Criteria: 
 
To more thoroughly determine the determinants of dowry we employed multiple regression analysis. Table 
1 reports the model summary from this study. 
 
                                                 
1
 The data have kindly been provided by A. B. Deo Lalikar to examine the demand for dowries and brides characteristics in 
marriages and empirical estimates for rural South Asia, to Manuscript University of Washington, September 1990. 
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Table 1.       Model Summary 
 
Model R R.Square Adjusted  
R square  
Std. error of  
The estimate 
Change statistics 
R square 
 Change 
F change Sig. F change 
1 .481
a
 .231 .226 28485.635 .231 41.481 .000 
2 .518
b
 .268 .258 27886.662 .037 6.992 .009 
a. Predictors: (constant), X11 
b. Predictors: (constant), X11, X20 
c. Dependent variable: X4 
 
The rationale is that value of R square shows that the final regression model can be predicted with two 
independent variables (wet land owned X11, and dummy Husband’s father secondary education X20) 
out of 19 independent variables explains 26.8% of the variance of dowry X4. That‟s not great but we‟re 
getting there. Value of Std. Error of the Estimate is also decreased in every step which demonstrates the 
improvement in the overall model fit. The findings from this analysis is shown in Table 1.  
Table 2 reports the information about ANOVA summary from this study. 
 
Table 2. 
ANOVAc
3E+010 1 3.366E+010 41.481 .000a
1E+011 138 811431412.0
1E+011 139
4E+010 2 1.955E+010 25.137 .000b
1E+011 137 777665899.0
1E+011 139
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
2
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), X11a. 
Predictors: (Constant), X11, X20b. 
Dependent Variable: X4c. 
 
 
F and Sig. - The F-value is in last model 2 yielding F=25.137.  The p-value associated with this F value is 
very small (0.000) is used to answer the question "Do the independent variables reliably predict the 
dependent variable?" Hence we could say that the group of variables (X11, X20) can be used to reliably 
predict dowry X4 (the dependent variable). It means that the model is significantly acceptable for prediction 
purpose for dowry.  
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Table 3. 
Coefficients
a
 
Model  Unstandardized  
coefficients  
Standardized  
Coefficients 
t Sig  Collinearity  Statistics 
B Beta  Tolerance  VIF 
Constant  -2557.319  -1.011 .314   
X11 410.402 .417 5.430 .000 .903 1.107 
X20 30088.084 .203 2.644 .009 .903 1.107 
   a. Dependent Variable: X4 
 
 
Results from the estimation of parameters and coefficient values are reported in Table 3 above. Aside from 
all the variables in particular wet land owned X11, and dummy Husband‟s father secondary education X20 
has a great influence on the amount of net dowry paid. The beta coefficients indicate the degree of influence 
the corresponding independent variable has on variations in the dependent variable (the higher the value of b 
the more influential the independent variable) and the sign (pos., neg.) indicates the nature of the 
relationship (whether the independent variable and the dependent variable move together or in opposite 
directions).  
       Y = a + b1X 11 + b 2X 20   
As a result of above discussion the main estimating equation is better represented by:  
Dowry Predicted = -2557.319 + 410.402 * X11 + 30088.064 * X20     
The interpretation of the coefficients from a linear regression model is fairly straightforward which tell us 
about the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables as well as the amount 
of increase in dowry that would be predicted by a 1 unit increase in the predictor.  Where as the predicted 
values of constant (-2557.319), also depicts that the dowry paid is expected to be -2557.319, when no wet 
land owned by husband as well as no secondary education husband father is completed. It means in this case 
dowry amount will be paid by the groom‟s family to bride‟s family in rural areas of the subcontinent. X20 
which is a dummy variable is commonly used to examine group and time effects in regression. The dummy 
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variables do not change the nature of the relationship or slope, but only provide for differing intercept 
among the groups 
Results: 
 
The finding in the model is that in case of all the variables given the one variable which statistically has an 
impact on dowry paid is the wet land owned by husband‟s house hold however there is no other independent 
variables influence on the dependent variable which have an impact on the dowry paid in the rural 
subcontinent. 
 
Another finding is that the dowry paid has a negative intercept, when no wet land owned by husband as well 
as no secondary education husband father is completed. It means in this case dowry amount will be paid by 
the groom‟s family to bride‟s family in rural areas of the subcontinent.  
 
Another finding is regarding the father‟s education that is also an important factor in all dummy variables 
which has an impact of getting education on secondary level, so it is inferred that in rural areas of 
subcontinent the father who have education on secondary level have only provide differing intercept among 
the group and add in the value of intercept not in the slope or the nature of relationship. Statistically the 
result provide support that not all variables in the given data are the determinant of dowry  but only two 
variables in which one is dummy variable have an impact and effect on the amount of dowry paid.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
The results of the empirical analysis support the wet land owned by husband‟s household explaining in 
determining the value of dowry paid in urban areas, whereas dowries also serve the role of a pre-mortem 
inheritance in rural areas. Since the traditional custom of dowry in subcontinent is considered an inheritance to 
daughters, it appears that this custom still persists in rural areas whereas, like in Pakistan, India and 
Bangladesh, the custom has evolved into a groom price payment in urban areas (Anderson, S., 2000). This 
would seem to suggest, that from the male perspective, the institution of dowry is not considered detrimental 
to either women or themselves. 
 
This is suggested by the fact that status and the affluence of husband‟s family as well as the secondary 
education of husband‟s father is an important determinant of the incidence of dowries. Moreover, the 
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probability that brides' parents paid a dowry is not related to the age and schooling years of either brides or 
grooms or their families.  
Further, since most villagers support the practice of dowry, there is little threat of  anyone lodging a 
complaint. While the practical mechanisms for complaining about dowry are far beyond most 
villagers, especially women, one of the greatest barriers for women going to court is the realization 
that she will not be welcomed back to her own home if she makes an official complaint  (Shahnaz. 
2006). As Raziya of Dhitua opined, 
“
Without dowry, no one will take our daughters. If only the 
boys
’
 fathers decline to take dowry, then the practice will stop”. (Shahnaz. 2006). 
 
Discussion and Managerial Implications:  
From a scholarly perspective, dowry has spurred a flowering of sharp thinking about the economics 
and sociology of dowry and marriage payments more broadly. In  this sense, whether dowry exists 
or not is somewhat beside the point, as the theory and empirical tools that have been developed to 
address the issue are of broad utility to social scientists. From a practical and policy-making 
perspective, however, the question of the existence of dowry paid is critical. Using basic statistical 
techniques, we fail to corroborate the widespread claim that real dowry amounts have risen 
substantially in South Asia. (Arunachalam and Logan, 2008) 
 
Despite this body of research, which is tested on the given data of rural areas of subcontinent is not 
significantly and practically supported our equation of explaining determinants of dowry, however it is also 
suggested that there may be many other construct that has not been examined. Even within the context of 
this study, we cannot state which action should take to create specific behavior to control the dowry system.  
 
Thus we suggest that researcher should do more to understand the significant determinant of dowry. This 
would provide useful guidance to manager and executives. Thus we recommended that much work remains 
to be done to find out in term of developing a suitable equation of dowry system and empirically testing our 
proposition.  At the same time, encourage other scholars to continue the important work being done in this 
area. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Definitions of variables 
 
N = Observation Number, X1 = wife‟s height (cm), X2 = wife‟s age at marriage, X3 = wife‟s schooling 
years, X4 = net dowry paid (including marriage expenses) By the bride‟s household to the Groom‟s 
household (in constant 1983 rupees), X5 = dry land owned by Wife‟s household when she was 15, X6 = wet 
land owned by wife‟s household when she was 15, X7 = Husband‟s age at marriage, X8 = Husband‟s school 
years, X9 = Husband‟s height (cm), X10 = dry land owned by husband‟s household when he was 15,  
X11 = wet land owned by husband‟s household when he was 15, X12 = years of marriage, X13 = low-caste 
dummy, X14 = medium-low-caste dummy, X15 = medium-high-caste dummy(excluded category is high 
caste), X16 = whether the husband‟s father was an agricultural cultivator (farmer), X17 = whether the 
husband‟s father was an (landless) laborer, X18 = dummy (husband‟s father had some primary education) 
X19 = dummy (husband‟s father completed primary education), X20 = dummy (husband‟s father completed 
middle or secondary school education) 
 
